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SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
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Naohiro Yashiro*
Declining population as well as population aging has substantial
impacts on the economy and on the society. By contrast, the size of the
population usually does not matter for economic development, if it is
stable; Switzerland and Sweden, for example, are rich countries with
fewer than 10 million people. However, the process of declining does
matter, particularly when it is accompanied by a signiﬁcant change in the
age structure. The aging of the population is a more serious issue in Japan
than in any other OECD country. First, the speed of aging has been more
rapid there, reﬂecting the rapid economic development in the past, which
has been similar to that in other Asian countries (Figure 1). Second, the
social system in Japan is heavily dependent on seniority rules, based on
the pyramid-like age structure of the past. Third, human resource
allocation in Japan is constrained by the ﬁxed social roles for men and
women, both at work and at home.
DOES DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE MATTER?
It has been argued in previous sessions that demographic change per
se does not matter, and that what matters is the social security system,
which can distort the economy through its tax collections and beneﬁt
provisions. Though I do not deny the social security problems, I do think
that declining fertility is also an important issue, at least for those
countries where fertility is at a particularly low level, Italy, Germany, and
Japan, for example. Concerning the causes for the fertility decline, Gary
Becker’s theoretical explanation that households are substituting quality
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countries, including Japan in the period from the postwar baby boom to
the mid 1950s. However, after stabilizing at the population replacement
ratio of 2.1 in the following two decades, the Japanese fertility ratio has
since declined continuously, reaching 1.35 in 2000. A major factor behind
the fertility decline since the mid 1970s is its association with the falling
marriage rate. In Japan, where only 1 percent of births occur outside
marriage, the lower marriage rate leads directly to fewer children, even
with the average number of children per married couple unchanged at
two. The continuous decline was not entirely expected by demographers,
and persistent prediction errors have been made in only one direction,
that is, the projections have always been optimistic (Figure 2). Although
this is evidence of the difﬁculty of projecting fertility trends, it also
indicates the presence of an underlying force lowering the fertility rate
that is associated with economic development. I believe the decline in the
Japanese fertility rate is not necessarily the result of optimal decisions by
individuals, but it is to some extent the result of market failure.
The increase in the labor force participation of Japanese women is the
single most important factor in the decline in fertility. The increase in the
number of working women reﬂects an expansion of the service indus-
tries, providing better working opportunities, and an increase in college
enrollment, improving the quality of labor. Higher labor market partici-
pation by itself does not necessarily lower the fertility rate, as shown by
the example of the Scandinavian countries. But this subtle revolution has
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Faced with society’s ﬁxed gender roles with men at work and women at
home, Japanese women ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to manage working
full-time and child-rearing at the same time.
Japan’s famous employment practices of long-term job security and
seniority-based wages have been considered to be favorable to most
workers. But these beneﬁts to workers are only possible in exchange for
long working hours, frequent job rotations (often to different locations),
and large wage differentials between full-time and part-time workers.
These Japanese employment practices obviously work against many
female employees. A married man is considered to be more reliable by his
supervisor if he has a his family to support at home, while a married
woman is assumed to be less productive, since she has her husband and
children to take care of. This “asymmetry” in the consequences of
marriage by gender has brought about a trade-off for women between
work and marriage. Women used to prefer marriage to work in the past,
but they have come to do the opposite with the increase in the “oppor-
tunity costs of marriage,” as they relate to women’s own earnings. This is
not inconsistent with the fact that 90 percent of Japanese single women
still wish to marry sometime, when they meet men who can compensate
for the opportunity costs of marriage, although the possibility becomes
scarcer with the increasing economic position of the average woman in
Japan.
The opportunity costs of marriage are substantial under a system of
long-term job security and seniority-based wages. Once a woman leaves
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she cannot return to her previous full-time job after several years of
child-rearing, but only to part-time jobs with lower wages. This is the case
mainly because of the lack of mid-career job opportunities and the fact
that hiring older persons is more costly for the ﬁrm. Thus, if one accounts
for the lifetime opportunity costs of marriage and child-rearing for an
average woman college graduate, they amount to about $1.5 million
when compared with the aggregate earnings at full-time up to the age of
retirement. Of course, one does not always count the cost of having
children in money, but there is a good possibility that these substantial
and still rising opportunity costs affect people’s behavior.
The above economic analysis of the reasons for declining fertility
gives us a clue to future developments. Because the labor force is
declining, the labor force participation of women should be further
stimulated, which is likely to lower the fertility trend still more. This
“vicious circle” between an increasing number of women working and a
declining fertility rate is what demographers have missed for a long time.
Although declining fertility is to some extent inevitable in industrial
countries, in those countries, including Japan, where the fertility rate is at
the lower end, the decline also may reﬂect underlying social problems, as
a fever does sickness. The government has put top priority on the policy
target of reversing the decline in fertility, but its effectiveness depends on
a major change in labor market practices, along with various new policies
to support the two-earner family.
MAJOR IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
In many developed nations, a common reform of the social security
system aims at preventing early retirement. In European nations, in
contrast to both the United States and Japan, skilled laborers who are still
able to work have a marked tendency to choose to leave the labor market
and to rely on a public pension. This tendency results in a high rate of
early retirement (Figure 3). When the number of older workers is viewed
as a percentage of the total number of workers, excluding the currently
unemployed, an even sharper disparity appears. A relatively low rate of
employment for the population at large tends to raise labor costs. This
increase reduces ﬁrms’ demand for workers and raises unemployment
among young people. It also narrows the tax base for social security and
increases the tax burdens on individuals and ﬁrms, resulting in the
possibility of a vicious circle between a further decrease in employment
by ﬁrms and increases in their tax burden.
Turning to social security issues, the public pension system serves
the elderly population in two ways: First, it provides a stable ﬁnancial
base for the elderly, and second, it supplements the loss of income that
results from leaving the workplace. A person is eligible for this pension
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the labor market to receive it. A pension that is granted on the condition
of a person’s retirement from the workplace has the same effect as a
subsidy that facilitates retirement among the elderly (alternatively, it
works as a “tax” on one’s work in the labor market), thereby creating a
dilemma between providing an income for the elderly and promoting a
longer stay in the labor market.
Such problems are addressed in Japan through a “part-employment,
part-pension” system, which helps maintain a set level of income on the
basis of wages and pension added together for those between the ages of
60 and 64. However, if the amount of additional income through earnings
results in a corresponding decrease in the pension, that income is in effect
fully taxable, thereby discouraging continued employment among the
elderly. For this reason, a reform was implemented in 1994 whereby the
decrease in the pension was ﬁxed at one-half the amount of increase from
the earnings (making the earnings only 50 percent taxable).
Even in this case, where an individual continues to work after
reaching the age of 60 (the age eligible for a pension), he or she will not
be able to receive the full amount of pension entitlement in his or her
lifetime. A comparison of OECD nations in terms of the taxation of “social
security wealth” that could be obtained in full upon early retirement
reveals that in social systems where “working does not pay” the rate of
employment among the elderly population is signiﬁcantly lower (Figure
4). In addition to the cultural factors which are often thought to explain
the gap between nations in elderly employment rates, it is evident that
economic incentives also play an important role.
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becomes necessary to classify the public pension as a type of savings after
retirement, by designating age as the only condition for receiving a
pension. The total amount of pension granted in life can remain ﬁxed, on
the basis of average life expectancy, regardless of the actual age at which
an individual retires. It would also be important to set up a rate of
adjustment (decrease or increase) that corresponds to the time at which
the pension begins. Also, ﬁxing the amount of pension that a person is
eligible to receive at a standard retirement age (for example, at 65) such
that it correlates to social security insurance premiums will help to
establish an equilibrium between earnings and expenditures of the
pension program. However, one problem that should be noted here is
that this approach is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of
social security, which is intended to “secure a pension for daily suste-
nance.”
FOREIGN TRADE AND IMMIGRATION
Finally, let me comment brieﬂy about immigration, in which so
many people have expressed interest. Does it serve to solve a demo-
graphic problem? Most people say no, and I am inclined to agree, because
immigrants eventually get older and they need beneﬁts too. What we
could do to offset demographic change is simply to employ foreign
workers of productive ages, who would then retire in their own country.
302 Naohiro YashiroTheoretically, it is our best solution. I do not know whether such an
approach is feasible or not, but we can do the same thing through
international trade. Economics suggests that importing a labor-intensive
product from abroad is the same thing as importing a foreign neighbor,
and that is what Japan has been doing recently. We export capital to
China, or another East Asian country, and let the Chinese or East Asians
work in their own country. We then import their labor-intensive goods
from abroad. That substitutes for the actual importing of labor, and it is
more efﬁcient.
Importing foreign workers would simply defer our structural adjust-
ment, because the immigrants would be concentrated in the cheap labor
pool used by the labor-intensive industries that Japan cannot sustain
otherwise. If instead we export capital to another country and import its
labor-intensive products, then that will stimulate our own structural
adjustment. So this indirect way of importing foreign workers has better
effects for economic development. We try to make the best use of our
existing workers and also to utilize foreign trade.
As far as a policy for immigrants is concerned, the Japanese have
tried to open the door for skilled workers while still closing it against the
unskilled, with few exceptions. I do not believe this policy will be
sustainable in the long term, but in the immediate future I think this
policy will be maintained.
CONCLUSIONS
Demographic change does matter to the economy and to society,
particularly when it reﬂects underlying structural problems. With rapid
economic development in Japan and many East Asian countries, the
economy has changed a great deal, but the employment and family
systems have remained basically unchanged. Declining fertility may be
one of the indicators of various mismatches in the current social-
economic system. Removing such tensions, and improving the economic
and social system, should be an important policy target.
Also, the consequences of demographic change need to be mini-
mized. It is essential to reform a public pension system that has been
based on the concept of a traditional society, in which a relatively small
elderly population has depended on social support provided by a large
number of workers, and people have enjoyed growing prosperous. In
facing the aging society ahead, improvements in the current system can
be realized by maintaining ﬂexibility, fairness, and neutrality in public
systems, including taxation and social insurance.
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